Manual penetration testing
Every assessment is run by an operator working the system the way an attacker would. Scanners find candidates; findings are ranked by what an attacker actually reaches.
Authorized offensive security · San Diego
Penetration testing, adversary simulation, and AI security assessments. Understand how systems can fail, what is at risk, and what to fix next.
Not a scan, a client system, or a real finding.
02 / How we work
Every assessment is run by an operator working the system the way an attacker would. Scanners find candidates; findings are ranked by what an attacker actually reaches.
One verification cycle for the agreed findings, within the retest scope set in the statement of work, so you know what is actually fixed.
An executive summary for the people who fund the fix, and technical findings with reproduction steps for the people who make it.
You hear about a serious finding when it is found, through the escalation contact named in the rules of engagement — not at report delivery.
Scope, objectives and constraints are agreed before testing starts. If a smaller engagement answers the question, that is the one we propose.
03 / Services
Find the paths into and through a system, and show where each one ends.
External and internal networks, web applications and APIs, and cloud environments. Findings are ranked by what an attacker reaches, not by scanner output.
Test the response, not only the surface.
Objective-based operations against agreed targets, or a collaborative exercise run alongside your defenders with detections tuned inside the session.
FLAGSHIP SERVICE
Assess what the model can reach, and what it can be made to do with that access.
The assessment covers the application, the agent, its permissions, connected tools and the data flowing through it — not the model in isolation.
04 / AI red teaming
An assistant is rarely just a model. It is an application with a system prompt, an identity, a set of tools it can call, a store it can read from, and a user on the other end whose input becomes part of its instructions.
Every one of those is reachable. An assessment works the deployed architecture — what the agent can be told to do, what it can reach when it does, and what happens downstream when its output is trusted.
// connected tools
An agent that can file a ticket, send a message or call an internal API can be steered into doing it on someone else’s behalf.
// retrieved content
Text pulled from a document store, a web page or a past conversation reaches the model as input. It is not trusted content.
// permissions
Assistants are often given a service identity broader than any single user. The blast radius of one bad instruction follows that identity.
// sensitive data
Retrieval boundaries decide which records a given user’s question can surface. Those boundaries are testable, and often weaker than assumed.
05 / What you receive
A finding nobody can reproduce is not a finding. Everything is written to be acted on by the team that owns the system.
06 / Sample finding
Written for two readers at once. The example below is constructed for this page. It is not a client system, a real result, or a working technique. For findings from a real engagement, generalized under its confidentiality terms, read an engagement record.
Support assistant → ticketing API → customer records.
The assistant calls the ticketing API with a service identity that can read every tenant, and the lookup is constrained by the argument the model supplies rather than by the signed-in user.
A customer using the assistant can obtain another customer’s support history, including anything those tickets contain. The exposure is a contractual and regulatory matter before it is a technical one, and it leaves no trace that distinguishes it from ordinary use.
Authorize the tool call rather than the assistant. Pass the signed-in user’s identity through to the ticketing API and enforce tenant scoping server-side, so a request for an out-of-scope record fails at the API regardless of what the model asks for.
Retested during the agreed retest window with the same evaluation case, plus a regression check added to the customer’s test suite.
07 / Engagement process
Agree the assets, objectives, exclusions and operational constraints.
Fix the testing window, the intensity, the escalation contacts and the stop conditions.
Obtain signed authorization to test before any testing begins.
Work the agreed scope inside the agreed boundaries, with progress communicated.
Deliver an executive summary and technical findings with evidence.
Verify agreed fixes within the retest scope defined in the statement of work.
08 / Buyer questions
Send the systems, the timing and the constraints. You get a scoped proposal, not a sales sequence.